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Organization of the Presentation
• Provincial Splitting in Comparative 
Perspective
• Previous Explanations for the 
Phenomenon
• My Theory of Political Gerrymandering
• Initial Evidence for Gerrymandering
• ReLogit test of Provincial Separations
• Additional Observable Implications
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Previous Explanations for 
Provincial Splitting
• Governing Capacity: A province that is large in 
surface area or population is too large for one 
leader.
• Regional Balance: Northern provinces should be 
favored over the South.
• Culture: Vietnam is returning to borders created 
before 1954 by the French Governor
• Provincial-Central Relations:
– New provinces represent the strengthening of provincial 
governments against the center.
– Or a weakening of the provinces…
Gerrymandering in Vietnam
“Fragmenting or submerging the voting strength  of
a group to create districts in which that group will
constitute a near certain minority,”
(Groffman,1985).
• The key divide in Vietnam is between reformers 
and conservatives in the Vietnamese central 
government over the role of the state sector in 
economic development. 
• Is it possible that gerrymandering takes place 
along this dimension?  This is the driving 
theoretical motivation of the paper.
My Theory
• I hypothesize that reformers have improved their 
voting strength at Central Committee meetings by 
hiving off private sector dominated provinces from 
SOE-dominated provinces.
• They have been able to accomplish this by buying-
off conservative leaders through pork in the form 
of infrastructure and construction projects in the 
new provinces, providing a valuable source of 
kickbacks for more central leaders.
• The more cabinet officials originating from a 
province, the more likely it is to be split in order to 
create non-overlapping patronage channels.
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Some Circumstantial Evidence
1. Separations coincide with major debates over 
the role of state owned enterprises.
2. Number of non-state provinces increases 
dramatically, while the size of state GDP in 
output remains the same.
3. Funky gerrymander-like borders that carve-out 
SOE centers.
4. Anecdotal evidence of separations and their 
connections with cabinet members. 
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Political Milestones Coinciding with Provincial Separations
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Provincial Splitting Example
Vinh Phu Province in 1996
Vĩnh Phú
Hà Nội
Việt Trì
New Provinces of
Vinh Phuc and Phu Tho in 1997
Phú Thọ
Vĩnh Phúc
Hà Nội
Việt Trì
Phú Thọ
Vĩnh Yên
A Closer Look at the Viet Tri-mander
Việt Trì
Anecdotal Evidence
• Phan Ngoc Tuong, Minister of Construction, 
openly supports division of provinces, 
particularly his home province Binh Tri Thien.
• Da Nang and Bac Ninh created after the VIIIth
Party Congress that elevated their compatriots 
Pham  Pham Van Tra and Phan Dien to the 
Politburo.
Rare Events Logit Test of the 
Gerrymandering Hypothesis
• Dependent Variable: Dichotomous variable measuring 
whether a province was split between 1989 and 2004. Newly-
created provinces become new units in subsequent years.
• Key casual variable: The interaction between state sector 
share of provincial output and the number of provincial 
compatriots represented in Hanoi on the Vietnamese cabinet.
• Control variables: Pollution; Surface Area; Years since Party 
Congress; Share of agriculture in provinces; Dummy variable 
measuring whether province has already been split; Dummy 
variable measuring whether province is at 1954 French 
borders; Regional dummies; Percentage ethnic minorities; 
Border with foreign country; and Per capita GDP.
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Substantive Effects of Controls
• Moving from the 25th percentile of population to 
the 75th increases the probability of separation 
by 4.2%
• Moving from the 25th percentile of surface area 
to the 75th increases the probability of 
separation by 6.6%
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Interaction Effect
• At ideal structural separation 
conditions, a move from the mean to 
the 75th percentile of the SOE-Cabinet 
interaction increase the probability of 
separation by 36%.
• But what does a simultaneous shift in 
state sector and cabinet officials 
mean?
• Let’s take a closer look…
Predicted Probability of Provincial Division 
(By State Sector Output with Number of Cabinet Officials)
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Tests of Other Observable 
Implications
• Private Sector Orientation in Policy at Provincial-Level
– 4/6 provinces were non-state dominated provinces created by 
provincial separations. 2/6 were non-state provinces 
throughout the sample (Vietnam Provincial Competitiveness 
Index, 2005).
– Non-state provinces have average score of 58.5 compared to 
54.5 for state-dominated provinces on PCI.
– “The density of SOEs in a province has a negative impact of 
private sector’s access to key resources and a negative 
influence on private sector growth in terms of firms and 
employment.” (Nguyen Van Thang, 2005).
• Large Transfers to Newly Created Provinces.
– Split province receives 8.2% of GDP in Government 
Investment Contracts; Non-Split Province receives only 4.6%.
– New provinces with compatriots serving in cabinet receive 
9%.
– Split provinces receive 13% of GDP in government transfers; 
Non-Spit provinces receive 9%.
– New provinces with compatriots serving in cabinet receive 
15%.
Concluding Questions
• Is gerrymandering a sign of 
democratic development?
• What do we make of 
gerrymandering and its policy 
implications in a one-party 
state?
